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Abstract. In formal semantics of natural language, an intersective in-
terpretation works for many adjectives: x is a French lawyer iff x ∈ {x:
x is French} ⋂ {x: x is a lawyer}. For those adjectives for which this
does not work, like “excellent”, we still have, at worst, a subsective
modification ({x: x is an excellent violinist} ⊂ {x:x is a violinist}). Nei-
ther of these applies to “fake”, whose formal interpretation is a tradi-
tional challenge. In this paper, I propose an analysis of the semantics
of “fake” in which the speaker’s attribution of intentionality (derived
or original) to the object or person of which she predicates fakeness
is central. In fact, the boundaries between the properties that ‘fake’
modifies and those it leaves unchanged aremoved in function of this
attribution of intentionality. In a famous 1994 paper, Dretske argues
that for something to be specifically mental it does not merely need
to exhibit original intentionality. It also has to be capable of misrep-
resentation, i.e. be a structure having a content independent of its
causes. I argue that this intuition is implicitly contained in the natu-
ral language use of “fake”.
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1 The Problem
Nouns and adjectives are commonly described in the semantic type-theoretical
approach as functions of type <e,t> that take an element or an individual e, and
return a truth-value t. For example, “lawyer” is a function that says "give me an
individual, and I’ll tell you whether or not it’s a lawyer." These functions are the
characteristic functions of sets, so that properties in the traditional sense can
be seen interchangeably as functions and as sets of individuals. What happens
when I combine two nouns, or two adjectives, or a noun and an adjective?
Consider sentence (1)
(1) x is a French lawyer
which says x ∈ {French}⋂{lawyer}. In fact, “French” is an intersective adjective.
in that (A) holds for any N.
(A) ||French N|| = ||French||⋂ ||N||
This approach seems a very elegant and obvious account of the composi-
tionality of nouns and adjectives. Unfortunately, it works only for a portion of
adjectives. Some cases for which it does not work are adjectives like “fake” or
nouns like “toy”. A fake violinist is not someone who is both fake and a violinist.
The problem can be stated as follows. A formal account of "fake" needs to be
able to tell us why and how a "fake gun" is neither a gun nor merely a non-gun.
Notice, in fact, that (2) is well-formed.
(2) That gun is a fake gun.
2 A first sketch of the account
We introduce an interpretation of nouns and adjectives as structured sets of
properties.
||G|| = 〈R,P〉
Where:
• G is a noun or adjective.
• R is the set of all relevant properties of G that all instances of Gmust have.
• P is the set of all prototypical properties of G that all prototypical instances
of G have. We assume R⊆P.
It is central to point out that R and P are not structured sets of properties
themselves, but plain sets of properties. In this approach, properties are still the
standard mathematical object: sets of individuals that have a given property.
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Only the meanings of natural language words like adjectives and nouns are not
merely properties, but structured sets of properties.
A basic example for the noun “gun”:
1. Gun
R= {shoots, kills}
P= {has the physical form, has a barrel, shoots, kills}
Now we can give an analysis of ‘fake’:
f(〈R,P〉) := 〈{ seems to r but cannot r:r∈R},{P − R}〉
That is, f is a function that takes as an input a structured set of properties, both
the relevant and the prototypical properties, and returns another structured set
of properties, where
• every prototypical property is left unchanged
• every relevant property r is modified from “r” to “seems to r and cannot r”.
A basic example:
1. fake gun = f(gun)
R = seems to {shoot, kill}and cannot {shoot, kill}
P = { has the physical form, has a barrel}
3 Discussion
3.1 3.1 Instability across contexts
I am not arguing that anytime we pronounce “fake gun” we intend the exact in-
terpretation given above. Rather, if the context makes shooting and killing rele-
vant to being a gun, ‘fake’ composes by taking only those properties that are rel-
evant as input. But these R-properties change over different contexts, as showed
by the example below.
Imagine aworld inwhich guns, instead of keys, are used to opendoors. Every
gun has unique bullets, you shoot on your door, the door reads the bullet, and
if the door recognizes it as its specific bullet it opens. These guns can still shoot
and kill. Now I tell you: that’s a fake gun.
All I am saying with this utterance is that it opens no door, and not that it
is not able to kill. I am using a different R set than I would be using to say, in
our actual world, something like “The gun he used to rob the bank was fake”. In
the gun-key world, the property of being able to kill might just be a prototypi-
cal property and not a relevant one. How the properties which are relevant to
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a predication change over different contexts is not the subject of this paper. By
contrast, I have shown that those properties change, and this is sufficient to pro-
pose an account of how ‘fake’ composes with heads by assuming it only applies
to those relevant properties.
The fact not all adjectives have an intersective or subsective meaning, like
“French” in aphrase suchaFrench lawyer, wasobservedbyReichenbachas early
as the ‘40s. In the sentence «John is a slow rider», “what is said is not that John
is slow in general but only that John is slow in his driving: thus the word ‘slow’
[. . . ] operates as a modifier of ‘drive’”.
Attempts to describe fake not only as a non-privative predication, but also
as an operation on some internal structure of NPs started as soon as the ‘80s.
Lakoff and Johnson’s account of privative NPs is based on the idea that priva-
tive Adjs operate ranging over the complex internal semantic structure of terms,
especially in the case of artifacts (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In ‘fake gun’, for
instance, they put forward an analysis which includes three representational di-
mensions: perceptual, functional, and genealogical.
Franks’ account shows that despite their apparent vagueness in classification
(“what is a gun?”), NPs work in a quasi-classical way: their internal attribute-
value structuredeterminesuncertainpredications, but the single attributes (‘fea-
tures’) work in a perfectly binary fashion (Franks 1995). Franks’ account is the
first that posits a complex internal structure that distinguishes between central
and diagnostic features. ‘Fake’ negates only the central features, keeping the di-
agnostic ones. This makes him predict that the central features of a gun do not
obtain of a gun, but the gundoesnot seem topossess these,making that account
of privatives significantly different from this account of ‘fake’.
Partee (1987), by contrast, did not posit any rich internal structure, provid-
ing a non-intersective extensional account in which adjectives like ‘fake’ coerce
their argument to a broadened extension. Thus in (2) «the first occurrence of
gun, modified by fake, is coerced, whereas the second, unmodified, occurrence
is not. Normally, in the absence of a modifier like fake or real, all guns are un-
derstood to be real guns, as is evident when one asks how many guns the law
permits each person to own, for instance. Without the coerced expansion of the
denotation of the noun, not only would fake be privative, but the adjective real
would always be redundant. »
More recently, Del Pinal (2015) proposed another kind of internal complex
structure onwhich ‘fake’ acts. NPs are constructed as having one principal exten
sion-determining, competence-linked sub-structureandanother, sub-structure
containing all the core facts about that noun, secondary and normally not in-
volved in compositionality. ‘Fake’ works differently than other modifiers be-
cause it takes as an input the Cstructure. Hence a fake gun appears to fulfill
all the core-facts we know about a gun. Such an extensional semantics can be
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employed in a HeimKratzer-like, traditional formal semantics.
Thisneedofpositinga rich structure, but still directly extension-linked (with-
out intensionalmediation), comesas a result of consideringPutnam’s influential
argument against definitional theories (1970). The argument goes as follows: for
any property that supposedly defines an artifact, we can always find a counter-
factual situation in which an object falls under the extension linked to that arti-
fact in spite of not having that property. Therefore, words are linked directly to
the extension they denote, and it is only through word-use that we understand
exactly what individuals fall under an extension.
This helps us address the issue of intensionality. Clearly this is not the topic
of the paper: the proposed account presupposes an intensional structure, but it
also works by partitioning an extensional space, hence embracing a view sym-
pathetic with Putnam (and seeing the properties we posited above as sets of in-
dividuals). However, I want to state my sympathy for intensional internal struc-
tures. I want to limit myself to observe that if reference and compositionality
occur on a part of the features of an internal structure (as is the case in R vs P),
and if the bundle of relevant features is not stable across contexts, thenPutnam’s
argument is less effective. Of course I can think of a counterfactual situation in
which an individual not having the property of ‘being a hunting big cat with a
mane” falls under the extension of lions. But this is because in that situation the
properties relevant to this categorization are different.
3.2 Improving the analysis
This is why I did not call R.properties essential. An object’s essential property,
if it exists at all, is possible world-invariant and would have to hold, in virtue
of this, across conversational contexts. For instance, if being a mammal is an
essential property of humans, then it is necessarily an essential property of hu-
mans. Fake objects, by contrast, enjoy bigger flexibility in that what the gun is
made for changes depending on the possible worlds that are being referred to. It
looks like, at least in the case of tools, relevant properties amount to the purpose
the object was made for. And there are good reasons to make an even stronger
claim, namely that some intentionality in themeaning of fake or in the object to
which we apply the function f plays a big role in the interpretation of the whole.
The following thought experiment should clarify this point:
Bob and Carl have built a super-powerful telescope: not only can it
show you the furthest galaxies, but you can also look through the ob-
jects you are pointing it to. By playing aroundwith the telescope and
looking at an ice-cold, lifeless and extremely distant galaxy, Bob hap-
pens to point at an atom-conglomerate which randomly appears ex-
actly like a gun. Bob calls Carl and they observe it together. How-
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ever, by looking inside the gun with the distance-rays-function of
their powerful telescope, Bob and Carl, who are also weapon-freaks
and know a lot about how weapons work, notice that, given how the
internal mechanism works, the gun could never shoot and kill. Ev-
erything else resembles exactly a gun.
In this situation, it wouldn’t be appropriate to say: “look, a fake gun!”, for
the only way in which this can become felicitous is by cooking up a context that
posits a builder and a purpose assigned to the gun.
If this is the case, then “fake” implies at least some kind of derived intention-
ality. By intentionality here I intend the standard Brentano definition (Brentano
1874). Brentano referred to intentionality as the power of minds to be about,
to represent, or to stand for, things, properties, and states of affairs. In philos-
ophy of mind debates this is nowadays referred to as “original” or “primitive”
intentionality. “Derived” intentionality is borrowed fromoriginal intentionality:
a gun borrows its intentionality from its conceiver. A gun is about shooting and
killing, a hammer is about beating nails.
One couldwith good reason contest that it is perfectly fine and reasonable to
talk about a fake lawyer and that this lawyer was not createdwith the purpose of
seeming a lawyer. But this does not change the fact that when stating a sentence
of the form
(3) x is a fake G
you are implying G has some kind of intentionality. This intentionality may be
derived, as for the gun, or original, as for the lawyer.
But the example with Bob and Carl leaves us with a question about the ac-
count of “fake” that we put forward above. The conglomerate of atoms seems to
shoot, cannot shoot and has all of the prototypical properties of a gun, includ-
ing the physical form , and nevertheless cannot be said to be a fake gun.. Yet the
account I proposed above predicts it to be a fake gun. What is missing?
There are two ways to restrict the account as a means of making the right
predictions:
I. Not only does “fake” change relevant properties to “seems to R and
cannot R”, but it crucially adds that it was built by its builder with the
purpose of seeming R.
II. “fake” as we defined it is fine. We just have to specify that it applies
only to things that already have a purpose, a derived intentionality.
That is why it is semantically awkward to say something like “look,
a fake atom!”, modulo the possibility of pragmatic adjustments that
posit a builder of that atom. It is really not clear what this should
mean and it does not at all look like something a competent speaker
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
9:2
(2018)
187
Janek Guerrini The Natural Language Interpretation of “Fake”
would say. The sentence above is therefore unclear unless we try to
think out a story in whichthat atomwas built by someonewho delib-
erately put into it the purpose of resembling through and through an
atom. In this case we would no longer be talking about semantics as
it would be a pragmatic adjustment.
Basically, our decision must be whether to add some operations to what the
function “fake” already does (I.) or to restrict its domain (II.).
Before making the decision, it may come in handy to unpack what exactly
“seem”means when we are saying that a fake G seems to R and cannot R. A rea-
sonable account for sentences like
(4) j seems to be playing
might be that when you utter such a statement you are saying that you think
that an observer will think that j is playing. Nowwe can unfold amore complete
interpretation of “fake”:
f(〈R,P〉) := 〈{ is capable of fooling j into thinking that r and cannot
r:r∈R},{P − R}〉
Where j is a particular observer, a ‘judge’ or, in its absence, an average ob-
server. This intuition is drawn from the Moltmann 2010 account of taste predi-
cates. Consider the two following examples:
(a) Ron’s eyes are shaped in a particular manner, which cannot see the dif-
ference between a gun and a drill. Dan usually threatens him with a drill. When
he tells the story to his brother, he says “And then I was pointing my fake gun
towards him, and. . .”
(b) “Monopoly bills are fake”.
In case (a), j is Ron. In case (b), j is clearly the average observer modulo the
assumption of a lack of knowledge about the nature of monopoly.
To translate this into an example, postulating that in a given context, i.e. in a
given possible-worlds set
3 lawyer
R= {has a law degree, is member of the bar}
P= {wears a robe, has good rhetoric}
4 fake lawyer=f(lawyer)
R= is capable of fooling j into thinking that{has a law degree, is member of
the bar} and it is not the case that {has a law degree, ismember of the bar}
P= {wears a robe, has good rhetoric}
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The judge parameter is, alongsidewith the intensional structure, what differ-
entiates this analysis from Del Pinal’s, which states that a fake gun was made to
have the perceptual features that make it look like a gun, but doesn’t make any
predictions regarding to whom the fake gun should look like a gun.
We still have to decide whether “fake” not only modifies but also adds some
operation to the function it applies to (I.), or it has just a domain restricted to
what the speaker attributes somederived or original intentionality (II.). It is very
unclear which of the two options delivers a better natural language meaning.
The different predictions made by these two hypotheses concern whether the
mental-agent-requiring content is at-issue or presuppositional. At-issue con-
tent is plainly relevant to truth conditions. So if the at-issue content of a sen-
tence is false, then its negation is true. Presuppositional content, by contrast,
works differently. Take for instance the famous Russellian example “The king
of France is bald”. Because the presupposition of the sentence is not fulfilled, it
is neither true nor false, and the same hold for its negation. A characteristic of
presuppositions is that, unlike at-issue content, they project out of embedded
clauses. Take following sentences:
(i) If that thing over there is a fake atom, I’ll be really surprised.
(ii) That thing over there was built by someone, that’s for sure, but if it’s a
fake atom I’ll be really surprised.
Under hypothesis I sentence (i) presupposes that "that thing over there was
built by someone," while (ii) triggers no presuppositional content. In fact, the
content that is supposedlypresupposed in (i) is asserted in (ii), and therebymade
at-issue. Under hypothesis II neither sentence presupposes anything. Another
example that might help clarify is following:
Under hypothesis I sentence (i) presupposes that "that thing over there was
built by someone," while (ii) triggers no presuppositional content. In fact, the
content that is supposedlypresupposed in (i) is asserted in (ii), and therebymade
at-issue. Under hypothesis II neither sentence presupposes anything. Another
example that might help clarify is following:
A: Ohmy gosh, there’s a fake atom over there!
B: What you just said is false, since no one built that thing.
B: What you just said is false, since no one built that thing.
Again, if B’ seemsmore of a plausible reaction than B, then itmakes a (all but
uncontroversial) case for II. So all really depends on which intuitions we have:
is there (more of) a presupposition failure in (i) there than in (ii)? Is B’ more
plausible than B? An informal survey among my colleagues found contrastive
intuitions. Experimental work might be needed on this, as judgements are very
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subtle here. Del Pinal, on the other hand, seems to be more empathetic with I,
as he makes the way in which a thing comes into being at-issue. If we were to
make the same choice, we would have following meaning assigned to ‘fake’:
f(〈R,P〉) := 〈{ was built with /has the precise purpose of fooling j into
thinking that r and cannot r:r∈R},{P − R}〉
3.3 Intentionality andmisrepresentation
In his 1994 paper, Dretske argues that intentionality per se is not mental. For
take the example of a compass:
(a) the compass indicates the North-pole
(b) the North-pole is coextensional to the habitat of polar bears
The conclusion of
the compass indicates the habitat of polar-bears
is not justified. We have generated an intensional and referentially opaque
context. This is enough in order for something to have original intentionality.
Dretske defines intentionality in the following terms:
if ascribing a property to x generates an intensional context, then x
exhibits original intentionality.
Wealreadydefinedderivative intentionality aspertinent to thoseobjects (like
a gun) whose representing such-and-such can be explained in terms of the in-
tentionality of something else. Then how is a compass different from a gun?
The intentionality of the device is not, like the intentionality of words
and maps, borrowed or derived from the intentionality (purposes,
attitudes, knowledge) of its users. The power of this instrument to
indicate north to or for usmaydependonour taking it to be a reliable
indicator (and, thus, on what we believe or know about it). but its
being a reliable indicator does not itself depend on us.
As the compass de facto exhibits original intentionality, original intentionality
cannot be thedistinguishingmarkof thought. Somere intentionality involved in
the semantics of fake wouldn’t be enough to prove that we represent anymental
agentbehind ‘fake’. Butwhat artefacts, however sophisticated, cannotdo, argues
Dretske, is misrepresenting something without our help:
Although clocks, compasses, thermometers, andfire alarms-all read-
ily available at the comer hardware store-can misrepresent the con-
ditions they are designed to deliver information about, they need our
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help to do it. Their representational successes and failures are un-
derwritten by and, therefore, depend on our purposes and attitudes,
the purposes and attitudes of their designers and users. As represen-
tational devices, as devices exhibiting a causally detached meaning,
such instruments are not therefore eligible ingredients in a recipe for
making thought. (Dretske 1994)
Now: “fake” always hides mental agents with misrepresentational states be-
hind its meaning, for note that:
• we showed that we assume of a hypothetic average observer that hewould
be fooled by the object / person. To be fooled, the observer must form
himself amisrepresentation. In otherwords, theremust be some semantic
content independent of its causes.
• we attribute to the builder fromwhich the object borrows intentionality or
to the person of which we predicate fakeness the activemisrepresentation
of the relevant properties of the thing of which they are a fake version.
Thus
(a) Misrepresentation needs a specifically mental
(b) The adjective “fake” needs misrepresentation
(c)wealwaysneedamental agentor an intentionalityderived fromaspecif-
ically mental agent when we use “fake”.
Note indeed that mere derived intentionality is not enough for fake objects.
For instance, if Iwant tobuild apaperweightbutbypureaccident endupmaking
something that resembles a gun, is that a "fake gun"? No, and yet it definitely has
derived intentionality. I built it with a purpose (being a paperweight) that it can
accomplish. What is needed behind the fake object is an active misrepresenter
who has the goal of that exact misrepresentation.
In conclusion, I turn to explaining why (2) is a perfectly fine sentence.
(2) That gun is fake.
That object can be described as a "gun" only from the point of view of the per-
son who is fooled, and as "fake" only from the point of view of a fully informed
person. But we know that there are observers that represent that thing as a gun.
It seems that there is a perspective shift between "gun" and "fake" taking place
in (2), from the fooled person to the speaker (or from the average person to the
well-informed speaker in case of a the standard filling the void argument). The
speaker says “gun” by putting himself in the average observer’s frame, and then
switches to his better-informed frame in order to predicate “fakeness” of the ob-
ject.
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By shifting frame of reference, we are shifting between different boundaries
between R and P . The domain of conversation modifies these boundaries only
insofar as it modifies what type of intentionality is behind of the objects of the
conversation. We delimit R and P in function of the mental agents we have to
posit in order to be able to predicate ‘fakeness’: the average observer and the
lawyer or the builder of the gun. We understand each other and agree in the vast
majority of occurrences inwhat respects an object is “fake”. This showshowcog-
nitively convenient it is for us to posit mental agents. How good we, as humans,
are at understanding others’ representational and misrepresentational states.
For this reason, accepting the analysis proposed in this paper and the linked
viewdoesnotnecessarilymeanendorsing an intentional viewof themind rather
than a computational one. Dennett himself Dennett 1987 concedes that inten-
tionality is for humans a convenient way to think about others’ mental states.
Ascribing to our chess opponent psychological states with intentionality makes
it easier for us to imagine what she is thinking, planning, avoiding, fearing etc.
All one is committed towhen accepting this analysis is thatwedo indeed ascribe
amental intentionality mainly characterized by capability of misrepresentation
to others, not that the intrinsic nature of the mind itself is intentional.
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